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This analysis examines the sealift execution scheduling process with the purpose of
identifying factors which require consideration in the development of an automated
execution scheduling system. Organizational, communicational, and algorithmic factors
are examined and assessed as to importance in scheduler development. From this
assessment, a proposed system structure is developed to provide a high level framework
upon which further research and development can be built. Recommendations for interim
improvement in the process are made as well.
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Strategic sealift is a major factor in the response and mobilization capability of this
nation's armed forces. In a major operation, sealift will account for 90-95% of cargo
movement [Ref. l:p. 4-1]. Recognizing the importance of such a capability, the
Secretary of the Navy has designated strategic sealift as a primary mission area. The
command responsible for directing and managing the successful accomplishment of the
strategic sealift mission is the Military Sealift Command (MSC). MSC's responsibilities
include both deliberate planning and execution aspects of strategic sealift employment.
Also tasked with ensuring the effective use of sealift and all transportation resources is
the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Established in 1987 as
suggested by the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (commonly referred
to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act), USTRANSCOM is a joint, specified command
responsible for transportation missions, responsibilities, and the forces of the three
Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAs), Military Traffic Management Command
(MTMC), Military Airlift Command (MAC), and MSC. In a peacetime environment,
USTRANSCOM centers its efforts upon developing and evaluating wartime planning and
execution procedures. It does not direct the administration of routine peacetime military
transportation. However, in a deployment/execution environment, USTRANSCOM
assumes operational command of all three TOAs and directs the employment of all
strategic transportation resources. So, in an execution scenario, MSC schedules sealift
under the control of USTRANSCOM.
B. SEALIFT CHARACTERISTICS
Sealift is, by structure and nature, a difficult process to manage. There is no large
dedicated sealift force available in place as there is with airlift. Therefore, the
composition of the sealift base that MSC will have to draw on is determined primarily by
private sector economic factors. Such factors include labor, construction, and operating
costs as well as commercial usefulness and taxes. As a result of these factors, sealift
ships tend to vary a great deal in such characteristics as speed, range, capacity, mission,
and military usefulness. These economic factors have also reduced the size of the U.S.
commercial fleet with large portions of the world commercial fleet sailing under foreign
flags of convenience. The net effect of the military usefulness and flag of convenience
factors is to put sealift schedulers in the position of having to manage an extremely scarce
resource. Also impacting this scarcity are the speed and range factors. At best, a given
ship can make an Atlantic transit to Europe in seven to ten days. The transit times are
much greater for Pacific transits. This reduces the availability of ships for multiple lifts,
especially if a ship is on the low end of the speed range. These considerations all
culminate in the determination that sealift execution scheduling must be done intelligently
and efficiently to derive the maximum benefit from scarce resources.
C. DEVELOPMENTAL PRIORITIES
While great attention and resources have been applied to deliberate planning
processes and systems, little effort has been applied to execution scheduling. Deliberate
planning centers around developing a concept of operations for an operation plan
(OPLAN) and validating the requirements and feasibility of that plan. Conceivably, the
information developed for that OPLAN could be drawn upon in an actual crisis, and, with
appropriate modification, be used for execution. The problem is that while deliberate
planning systems have been developed and improved, little effort has been devoted to
developing and improving the execution scheduling systems necessary to realize the
objectives of those OPLANs. Execution scheduling is still largely a tedious, manual
process, completely different from the deliberate planning process. If the deliberate
planning process is to have any real value, an equally effective execution scheduling
process must be established.
D. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this analysis is to examine and define the sealift execution
scheduling problem in order to provide a framework upon which an effective scheduling
system can be developed. The factors to be examined include the actual execution
process, existing systems, interfaces, and system requirements. From this examination,
a broad, high level system structure will be proposed. This structure will not be
sufficient in detail to begin system development. It will be sufficient to direct further
research into subareas of the execution scheduling problem. The hope is that such
research will eventually culminate in an effective, automated scheduling system.
II. EXECUTION PROCESS DESCRIPTION
A sealift operation is a massive undertaking. Even so, it is but a subfunction of an
entire process known as the Crisis Action System (CAS). This system is implemented in
crisis situations where time constraints are of great significance [Ref. 2:p. 209]. These
situations are further delineated as follows:
• Time available to plan the operation is limited to only a few days or weeks;
• Timely identification of resources is necessary to prepare forces, transportation,
and supplies;
• Actual movement and employment of forces is expected in the immediate future.
The purpose of CAS is to enable the Joint Deployment Community (JDC) to plan,
deploy, and employ U. S. military forces in an organized and expedient manner in a
relatively short period of time. These procedures are keyed upon effective use of
whatever time is available, rapid and effective communications, and use of previous
planning wherever possible. CAS is composed of the six following phases:
I. Situation Development
II. Crisis Assessment
III. Course of Action Development
IV. Course of Action Selection
V. Execution Planning
VI. Execution
All participants in the process have specific responsibilities and goals for each
phase. However, it should be noted that in a time-sensitive situation, significant
compression of the above phases can be directed. In such a situation a move directly
from Phase I to Phase V is well within the realm of possibilities.
CAS participants include the National Command Authorities (NCA), Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS), supported command (usually the Unified Commander responsible for
execution or plan development), supporting commands (commands who provide
augmentation forces or other support to the supported command), military services,
USTRANSCOM, and the TOAs. The primary means of interface and communications
for CAS is the Joint Deployment System (JDS) and the World-Wide Military Command
and Control System (WWMCCS). While CAS covers the entire deployment effort, only
those functions germane to the sealift execution problem will be discussed here.
A. CAS PHASES I AND II - SITUATION DEVELOPMENT ANT) CRISIS
ASSESSMENT
CAS Phases I and II are essentially crisis identification and monitoring phases. JCS
activates the CAS when it determines that a given situation has the potential to escalate
into a crisis. JCS may at this juncture direct all participants to join a JDS on-line crisis
teleconference through WWMCCS [Ref. 3: p. 1-2-1].
B. CAS PHASE IH - COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT
Phase II terminates and Phase III commences with the issuance of the Warning
Order from JCS [Ref. 3:p. 1-2-2]. The Warning Order contains the following elements:
• Situation
• Specific forces to include identification of supported and supporting commands
• Mission
• Potential Courses of Action (COA)
• Designation of potential commencement of deployment and employment dates
(C-Day and D-Day)
• Initial allocation of lift resources for planning
• Other information required for execution planning
The responsibility of the supported command during this phase is to further develop
the potential COAs. This can be accomplished in one of several ways. The preferred
method is to utilize an OPLAN already generated for JDS. This OPLAN will be a
product of the deliberate planning process and will require some revision to meet the
specific requirements of the crisis response. For those situations where no OPLAN is
available, a COA can be developed on-line with JDS or off-line locally for later input to
JDS. The latter method has the disadvantage of not allowing the supporting commands
to participate on-line in the development process, possibly requiring further revisions after
the other participants are able to review the COA.
Once development of a particular COA is complete, USTRANSCOM is notified by
the supported command that the COA is available for a deployment estimate. The next
step is to determine a closure estimate. A closure estimate is a projected date of
completion for the deployment, expressed relative to C-Day. With the TOAs,
USTRANSCOM provides closure estimates for each mode of transportation. At the
same time USTRANSCOM and the TOAs are at work on these estimates, the supporting
command and the services are analyzing the COA to determine the feasibility and
supportablilty issues critical to the operation. Depending on time-constraints, this can be
an iterative process, requiring the supported command to make changes to the COA based
on responses from USTRANSCOM, supporting command, and services.
The end product of the phase is the Commander's Estimate (OPREP-1). This
message is generated by the supported command after the deployment estimates are
received from USTRANSCOM [Ref. 3:p. 1-3-9]. The Commander's Estimate is
forwarded to JCS along with a recommended COA for decision.
C. CAS PHASE IV - COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION
Phase IV essentially consists of a decision stage. At this point, the National
Command Authority (NCA) has the Commander's Estimate and is considering the COAs
that have been developed for the crisis. Meanwhile, JCS has the option of issuing a
Planning Order to the participants. The main purpose of this order is to speed up
execution planning by providing specific guidance for actions to be taken in advance of
the NCA decision. Depending on the situation, the Planning Order may be the first
official guidance provided to some of the participants or it may be an update of previous
guidance. The Planning Order will normally contain the following elements:
• Forces and resources to be used in planning
• Objectives, tasks, and constraints of the operation
• Further planning guidance as appropriate
• Deadline for operation order
The participants will begin planning in accordance with the direction of the
Planning Order. [Ref. 2: p. 229]
D. CAS PHASE V - EXECUTION PLANNING
This crucial phase begins with the issue of the Alert Order from JCS indicating the
COA selected by the NCA and tentative or actual target dates for the operation. Based
on the information in the Alert Order, the supported command converts the COA into the
operation order (OPORD). The successful completion of this phase is critically
dependent upon USTRANSCOM and JDS. USTRANSCOM is the central coordinator
for execution planning and JDS is the primary instrument of that planning and
coordination. The central object of planning is the first increment of deployment, relative
to the Earliest Arrival Date (EAD) and C-Day (C0O0). For sealift, the first increment
is 30 days of scheduled lift from COOO - C029. For airlift, the first increment is 7 days
of scheduled lift from COOO - C006. [Ref. 3:pp. 1-9-5 - 1-9-8]
Initially, USTRANSCOM releases JDS coordinating instructions to all participants.
Included in these instructions are target dates for completion of updates to the JDS data
base. For the supported command, these updates are generated adjusting the requirements
of the COA to correspond to the Alert Order. The supported command is also required
to validate and update the data base for the first increment. When USTRANSCOM
receives notification of validation completion, the supporting command is notified to
begin sourcing the increment. Sourcing is a procedure by which the supporting command
resolves actual units, origins, and other characteristics against the hypothetical force
requirements contained in the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) file [Ref.
2:p. 335]. Accurate sourcing is critical to successful movement. If unexpected or non-
standard units or unit equipment are to be moved, it may unnecessarily delay items
crucial to the success of the operation. The supporting command is also responsible for
scheduling and manifesting organic transportation. Organic transportation is defined as
transportation resources assigned to a unit that can provide lift capability for part or all
of the unit's movement requirements, requiring partial or no support from the TOAs
[Ref. 4:p. 5-24].
USTRANSCOM will perform data validation upon the data base once it is notified
by the supporting command that sourcing and updating is complete. Once this data
validation procedure is complete, the data base is released to the TOAs for scheduling.
The TOAs will schedule lift for the first increment and any preparatory moves called for
in the OPORD. Entry of airlift schedules is expected within 12-36 hours from release
and sealift schedules within 24-48 hours. After the schedules are entered and
USTRANSCOM is notified, no changes are allowed to the data base unless coordinated
through USTRANSCOM.
USTRANSCOM is also tasked with monitoring any preparatory moves as scheduled
above. These moves are normally reflected as N-Day requirements in the data base,
where N is the number of days before C-Day [Ref. 3:p. 1-9-10]. For example, N002
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would be two days prior to C-Day. Once a preparatory move is completed, either the
supporting command or the parent service is tasked with updating the data base to reflect
the new geographic location of that unit. No further moves are made until the execution
order is given to begin Phase VI.
E. CAS PHASE VI - EXECUTION
The execution phase begins with the issue of the execution order from the NCA via
JCS. When the order is received, the date and time for execution is reviewed to
determine if any adjustment is required to the first increment. If significant adjustments
are required, the TOAs may elect to recompute the entire schedule, a process known as
reflowing the increment. If only minor changes are required, then the changes are made
and execution begins as scheduled [Ref. 3:p. 1-9-12]. USTRANSCOM will then begin
transmission of Automated Scheduling Messages (ASMs) to the units or major commands
involved. The TOAs continue incremental scheduling, adding a day or more of
scheduling information to JDS with each iteration. They also maintain the actual status
of units and lifts in JDS while USTRANSCOM assumes a monitoring and coordination
role. The actions performed during this phase continue until the operation is complete.
F. CAS TIMING FACTORS
As has been stated before, the major thrust of CAS is expedient deployment of
forces in a time-critical crisis. The possible compression of phases and limited time to
plan places a severe strain on current sealift scheduling resources. A period of 24-48
hours to schedule sealift for a major mobilization is a significant undertaking for a
computerized scheduling system, let alone a manual one. Unfortunately, with the dearth
of resources devoted to the execution scheduling problem, the latter approach is the one
most often used. The following chapter will describe the systems that are currently
available and their shortfalls with respect to the execution scheduling problem.
m. EXISTING SYSTEMS
There are two primary deficiencies in existing systems that preclude acceptable
performance in sealift execution scheduling. The first deficiency is one of purpose.
Much of the software that has been developed to date has been established to validate
operational plans. They do well at evaluating feasibility, but fall short in terms of
efficient scheduling. The Strategic Sealift Contingency Planning System (SEACOP) can
take up to 18 hours to evaluate a plan. The other problem is a consequence of the size
of the deployment database involved in executing a plan. In order to manage the vast
amounts of data associated with this process, the data base management system approach
has been embraced. The Joint Deployment System (JDS) and the Command and Control
Center Prototype, explained below, are both examples of this approach. Unfortunately,
the computational overhead associated with a data base system is too severe both in
memory usage and CPU time to be effective in a scheduling role.
A. JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
1. Background
The Joint Deployment System is defined by AFSC-1 [Ref. 2:p. 319] as:
Personnel, procedures, directives, communications systems, and electronic data
processing systems that directly support time-sensitive planning and execution and
complement peacetime deliberate planning by disseminating deployment
information.
The electronic data processing system portion of JDS is an extensive information storage
and retrieval system with a graphical display system to allow geographic displays of the
deployment objectives and process. It is the sole source of deployment information for
the TOAs and is controlled by USTRANSCOM. JDS does not perform scheduling; rather
it is the input and output point for the scheduling packages of the TOAs. The information
that JDS provides is the applicable portions of a plan's TPFDD. These data encompass
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all of the movement and cargo requirements, prioritization of arrivals, and other data for
a given plan. [Ref. 2:p. 337]
2. Interfaces/Users
The TOAs access JDS through WMMCCS. In the case of MSC however, its
JDS support comes through the OPNAV WMMCCS site located at the Pentagon. MSC
and the area commands, MSCLANT and MSCPAC, have on-line access to JDS, but they
are not supported as JDS end-users by the JDS support organization. Information can be
retrieved in the form of printed reports or on magnetic media. It can be retrieved in
pre-specified formats, or specialized retrievals can be developed to extract required
information using a retrieval language similar in syntax and format to COBOL.
Returning processed schedules to JDS is not quite as simple. The WMMCCS
Intercomputer Network (WIN) sites at MSC and the area commands are secure areas with
tightly controlled access, due to the nature of the information available. One of the
restrictions placed upon such sites is that magnetic media may only be brought into the
site with absolutely no information contained upon it. This precludes any automated
input of scheduling information developed outside of the WIN site. At present no means
exist to develop that information within the site. Therefore, any scheduling information
developed by an MSC Area Command must be entered into JDS manually by WIN
personnel.
3. Limitations
Interface with JDS is necessary for any sealift scheduling system, be that
interface direct or indirect. Using JDS's retrieval language to do the scheduling is not a
viable option, though properly structured and supported retrievals could be of immense
help in reducing the workload for a scheduling system. Proper support would include
assistance in developing those retrievals from the JDS support organization at
USTRANSCOM and in rewriting those retrievals when changes are made to the JDS
database structure.
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The performance of any scheduling system will also be degraded by any
manual transfer of information. A system which develops a schedule in 12 hours, but
takes another 12 hours for the schedule data to be entered manually is not responsive to
a crisis. Some means of on-line or automated communication with JDS must be
established. This can be accomplished by incorporating the system in the WIN site or by
modifying the entry restrictions to allow magnetic media containing the schedule to enter
the site. One possible solution would be to use some type of encoding which would allow
a WIN operator to determine if the information has been corrupted or tampered with.
The security of the site should not be compromised, but some means must be found of
transferring the schedule electronically at the area command level.
B. STRATEGIC SEALIFT CONTINGENCY PLANNING SYSTEM
1. Background
SEACOP is a system initially developed in 1972 as a transportation planning
model sponsored by the Strategic Sealift Division of CNO (OP-42) [Ref. 5:pp. iv, 1-3].
It is operated by MSC and is used to generate schedules based on a plan, exercise, or
study. It is in its fourth development iteration and resides on a WMMCCS Honeywell
6000 at the Washington Navy Yard. It is essentially a single plan gross scheduler which
uses a heuristic process to schedule plan lift requirements against lift assets, port
constraints, and time requirements. It produces several feasible schedules from which a
"best" schedule may be selected. It is a deliberate planning tool that is often used for
actual scheduling given the fact that nothing else exists for that purpose. It can take up
to 18 hours to run, depending on the size of the plan. It is constrained to a single reel
of tape for input, which requires extraction of the sealift requirements from the TPFDD
for a large plan [Ref. 5:p. 1-19].
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2. Interfaces/Users
SEACOP receives the TPFDD and movement table by tape downloaded from
JDS and MTMC through the MSC WIN site. Ship information and allocations are
obtained from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Annex J and, where necessary,
on tape from the Navy Operational Intelligence Center. It uses several internal files
including a port characteristics file and a type unit characteristics (TUCHA) file
containing detailed cargo data and quantities for standard military units [Ref. 5: pp. 1-13 -
1-14]. The output consists of selected reports and an MSC movement records file which
is transferred via WIN to USTRANSCOM/JDS. Additional information extracted from
the schedule is made available to MTMC and the MSC area commands through the WIN
site.
MSC is the sole user of SEACOP. Planners who wish to validate a plan must
submit the tape to MSC and request MSC conduct the SEACOP analysis. MSC area
commands have no capability to use SEACOP, even though the movement requirements
that they extract from JDS are generated by SEACOP.
3. Limitations
SEACOP is a deliberate planning tool inappropriate for execution scheduling.
It has no capability to reanalyze or readjust a schedule. Its heuristic processes are slow
and do not necessarily produce an optimal schedule. It has been modified extensively and
lacks potential for any improvement. Unfortunately, until something better can be
developed, it is the only sealift scheduling tool available. This is also unfortunate for the
area commands in that they still have no definitive software scheduling aid, and in a




The Sealift Strategic Analysis System (SEASTRAT) is the new deliberate
planning tool for sealift scheduling under development by the Navy Regional Data
Automation Center (NARDAC) in Washington, D.C. [Ref. 6:pp. xi, 3]. SAIL, the
Scheduling Algorithm For Improving Lift is being developed as a subsystem by the
Computing and Telecommunications Division at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL). It is being implemented on a new IBM 3090 mainframe computer at MSC by
NARDAC and ORNL. SAIL uses a combination of linear optimization and heuristic
techniques to develop schedules for planning and validation purposes. It is written in
FORTRAN 77 and interfaces to SEASTRAT and the required files through the mainframe
database system, FOCUS. It is still in development and testing, and as its developers
indicate, is subject to "...changes in the overall planning process within the deployment
community." [Ref. 6:p. 5] SAIL uses specific aggregation techniques to reduce the
number of cargos for scheduling by combining cargos into a "channel". This "channel"
consists of a group of cargos with similar characteristics and delivery constraints. This
allows the lift process to be modelled as a continuous flow, a necessary condition for a
linear programming formulation. SAIL also uses simulation routines to derive port
queueing and loading times to give a more realistic appraisal of plan feasibility.
2. Interfaces/Users
The inputs and outputs of this system are not unlike those of SEACOP. One
difference is the use of FOCUS by SEASTRAT to manage the information files used by
SAIL. Although this provides a means of easing the data management effort, it has a
negative effect upon system execution time due to the computational overhead inherent




The developers of SAIL stipulate from the beginning that it is a deliberate
planning tool not intended for execution scheduling. Even with its aggregation
techniques, the structure of an actual execution problem may still be difficult for a linear
programming transportation formulation. One consequence of the channelization
approach is that once cargoes are aggregated into a channel they lose their individual
identities. This is not acceptable for an execution scheduling system which must allow
for retrieval of a cargo's status at any given time in the deployment process. A more
discrete approach may preclude a linear programming approach. SEASTRAT's use of
FOCUS as the database interface causes severe difficulties for the system in terms of
package execution time. However, the system's purpose for existence is plan validation.
It appears to be a reasonable and intelligent attempt to address the lift scheduling
problem. Since it is a deliberate planning tool, it is not designed to be able to address the
unique requirements of an execution scheduling system. This does not exclude the
possibility that an execution scheduling system might be able to draw upon those elements
in SEASTRAT/SAIL that would be appropriate for the execution scheduling problem.
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTER PROTOTYPE
1. Background
The Command and Control Center (CCC) Prototype is a PC based information
system implemented on a TEMPEST-certified, secure Zenith AT-Compatible with two
removable ten megabyte hard drives. It is a combination of AUTOCAD for graphical
displays, Paradox for the database, Software Carousel to allow for swapping between the
two, and a driver program written in C. The database retrieval routines are written in a
Paradox-specific retrieval language and compiled so as to be inaccessible to the users.
It was developed under MSC contract and was put into operational testing at MSC
Headquarters and the area commands in the fall of 1988. At that time, the system was
only capable of using movement reports to track the location of ships. The users at the
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area commands were under the impression that the system in a later iteration would be
capable of serving in a scheduling role.
2. Interfaces/Users
At the time of its operational test, the CCC prototype had no means of
automated input. Entering movement report data was completely dependent upon
keyboard entry. It had no capability to extract information on-line, though it was thought
that database files might be transferred from the CCC prototype at MSC headquarters to
the area commands via the secure data transfer mode of the STU-III Secure Telephone
System. This would still mean that the information would have to be entered manually
at some point, be it at headquarters or the area commands.
There were only two means available of retrieving information from the
prototype. The first was through printed reports and the other would be through the
displays generated by AUTOCAD. Unfortunately, the secure Zeniths are equipped with
only a Color Graphics Adapter and Display. The information displayed by AUTOCAD
at that resolution was so cluttered as to be of limited value.
3. Limitations
The CCC prototype is an example of an ill-conceived and poorly executed
software procurement. It performs only nominally in its information retrieval role and
is so constrained by all aspects of the Zeniths as to restrict the potential for enhancing or
expanding the system. In terms of disk space, it uses most of the storage available on
each of the ten megabyte drives. With both AUTOCAD, Paradox, and Software
Carousel it consumes virtually all of the Zenith's main memory and a two megabyte
extended memory card, leaving little room to operate on new data. The loading and
execution of the package is painfully slow. The system requires that AUTOCAD be
loaded, executed in full, and swapped out before Paradox can be loaded and run. This
entire process takes about ten minutes before any data entry or retrieval can be
performed. Initial indications were that the removable drives, known for their slow
throughput, were the reason for the slowness of this process. An interleave adjustment
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was performed, increasing the access speed of the disks by 50% according to recognized
benchmarks. When the system was loaded from those disks, there was no appreciable
decrease in the loading time, indicating that the process was CPU intensive, not disk
intensive.
The contractor has addressed some of these concerns and stipulates that most
of the problems will be solved if the system is implemented on an 80386 based PC.
Unfortunately, at the time of this writing there are no TEMPEST-certified 80386
machines available, so use of a non-TEMPEST machine, while still being able to
minimize the TEMPEST hazard, is being investigated. Such a system would probably
make the information retrieval and display less painful, but is still not likely to allow for
the expansion of the package in terms of scheduling. And the communications/data
transfer aspects remain unaddressed.
E. OTHER SYSTEMS
Many other avenues have been explored on an in-house level to assist in sealift
scheduling. One example is a program of approximately 2500 lines of BASIC code to
sort the movement data downloaded from the WIN. This program sorts the data by
POE, POD, and ALD, extracts the valid unscheduled cargo, and provides a gross
assessment of how many of each possible type of lift asset would be necessary to move
the unscheduled requirements. Unfortunately this program is strictly dependent upon the
format of the retrievals from JDS. Given the fact that the area commands are not
supported JDS users, they have no control over those retrievals. And those retrievals
could easily be rendered useless by changes to the JDS database. Any system to perform
sealift execution scheduling must be isolated from such changes.
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IV. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
A. LEVEL OF SYSTEM OPERATION
One of the critical factors in an execution scheduling system must be a clear
specification of the level at which each of the potential users/user organizations may
exercise control over its operation. Those users, whose need for the system is strictly
informational do not need the same access to the system that a person with scheduling
authority needs. Therefore, a distributed approach to sealift scheduling is in order for the
execution problem.
1. USTRANSCOM
USTRANSCOM would, at most, need informational access to the system. If
the system were properly configured to interface with JDS, USTRANSCOM would likely
satisfy its informational requirements from JDS and not even bother with access to the
system.
2. MSC Headquarters
Owing to the fact that execution scheduling in the past has been dependent
upon the deliberate planning tools available at MSC Headquarters, MSC has been heavily
involved in the initial stages of the actual scheduling process. Their ability to participate
beyond the first increment is limited by SEACOP's restriction to a single schedule. But
under ideal circumstances MSC should occupy a role similar to USTRANSCOM. It
should monitor the scheduling process, allowing the personnel at the area commands with
the first-hand knowledge critical to effective scheduling to perform the actual scheduling
tasks. This monitoring could possibly be accomplished through JDS as well. If a
determination is made that MSC Headquarters should have a participatory role, that
participation should be limited to the first increment.
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3. MSC Area Commands
The two MSC area commands that will be crucial to mobilization planning and
execution are MSCLANT and MSCPAC. Responsibility for ensuring the timely
scheduling of lift rests squarely within those two commands. They are, in fact, the
operational commands of MSC. The local knowledge of facilities, characteristics, and
quirks of the their transportation environments is critical to effective scheduling. Yet,
these areas have been the most ignored in terms of automated scheduling support. Any
given OPLAN can require the scheduling and coordination of thousands of items, all with
several specific time and loading constraints. This is currently accomplished with pencil
and paper. MSCLANT and MSCPAC are where the emphasis on sealift execution
scheduling should be placed. Any tools developed for their use should be closely
coordinated with their scheduling personnel, not just their procurement or ADP personnel.
This was not what was done with the CCC Prototype and the result will likely be the
death of that package. It is a well known fact in software development that proper
requirements definition will make or break a package. This package should be designed
specifically for the use of the area commands in the context of their facilities and
requirements, preferably through contact with personnel at the area commands.
B. OPTEVIALITY/PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
The most significant parameter in the whole arena of sealift execution is time. In
a crisis situation, the search for the optimal schedule becomes secondary to the availability
of scheduling time. Such a search can involve evaluation of several deployment and
schedule options. Therefore, the developer must define speed of package execution as
the objective function, with schedule feasibility/optimality as a constraint. This is not to
suggest that optimality be ignored. In an era of scarce sealift resources, inefficient use
of assets could be deadly. But instead of an exhaustive search for the optimal schedule,
the emphasis should be placed on developing a "good" schedule that observes the
feasibility constraints placed upon it. This may, in fact, require more human interaction
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or heuristics to identify a "good" schedule than would be normally present in a pure
optimization/scheduling package, but this is not a typical scheduling problem. SEACOP
is widely recognized as a bad approach to the problem, consuming large computing
resources and time without rendering any flexibility to evaluate alternative lift options.
C. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS
As documented previously, attempts to manage the execution scheduling problem
with existing systems or database management systems (DBMS) have met with little or
no success. This is because the execution scheduling problem is totally different from the
problems that the other systems were developed to handle. Execution scheduling is at its
core a complex optimization problem and only an effort by optimization professionals will
yield a package capable of meeting the challenge.
An execution scheduler need not exist external to a deliberate planning package.
If all of the interfaces and information required for the execution scheduling package are
contained within the deliberate planning package, then the scheduler could exist as an
independent module included within. Unfortunately, even SEASTRAT does not meet this
requirement. The IBM 3090 mainframe on which it is being implemented is not
accessible to the area commands, violating a major requirement for an effective system.
Therefore, either some means of access to the 3090 for the area commands will need to
be developed or the execution scheduling package will have to be developed
independently.
Another approach to avoid in scheduler development is the DBMS approach. This
approach can be manifested either by developing the scheduler in a DBMS retrieval
language or by tying it to a DBMS for its input and output. The problem with the first
method is that a DBMS retrieval language is not suited for the significantly complex and
time-critical computations inherent in an optimization problem. It is akin to trying to
write a supercomputer operating system in BASIC. It can be done, but it would make
little sense to do so. The problem with the second method is time. Input/output
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processes are slow enough without compounding the situation with calls to a DBMS.
However, it is recognized that the amount of data used by a scheduler would be extremely
large and difficult to compile and maintain without a DBMS. The key here is to structure
the scheduler to take input from a flat or text file format containing only that information
required for scheduling. This flat file format could be produced by the DBMS following
an update so that it would be available to the scheduler. This way the scheduler could
input the information much faster than it would by making calls to the DBMS for each
item required.
Another popular trend in software development is to utilize off-the-shelf software
to drive down procurement costs, especially for Personal Computer (PC) software. This
may be appropriate for a DBMS or word processor, but it is entirely unsuitable for
scheduling purposes. The CCC Prototype is an excellent example of that fact. Even
most of the popular optimization packages available today would be unable to deal with
the requirements of this system without substantial modification. It should also be
mentioned that while keeping a package small and portable enough to run on a PC is an
admirable goal, the sheer volume of information, mass storage, memory, and speed
demanded of a such system will require mainframe computing power.
D. USER INTERFACE
The user interface is a critical area for two reasons. One reason is that the time it
takes the users to operate the system can be pivotal in terms of quickly executing lift
options. If a reflow of a COA is required or the next schedule increment is required, the
time required to use the scheduler can slow up the process significantly, especially if the
user is at a remote site and the communications link is operating below 9600 baud. The
other reason lies in the fact that the scheduler will be ineffective as a "black-box"
optimization package. It is the nature of military operations that changes and exceptions
are often made. Sealift is not exempt from such changes. The Naval Control of Shipping
Organization (NCSORG) is a prime source of possible changes [Ref. 7]. It will have the
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authority, when established, to control ports, schedules, and convoys, all of which will
have a significant effect on scheduling procedures. Some override capability must be
designed into the system. Manual verification and approval procedures must be
incorporated into the scheduler. This might appear difficult from the standpoint of a
optimization package. However, Brown et al. [Ref. 8] developed such a system for
Mobil Oil that has increased productivity and saved money. The task here is not
insurmountable.
E. EXTERNAL INTERFACES
Again, speed and time are the critical factors. The scheduler must be in such a
position as to effect a rapid exchange of information with JDS for both the initial and
subsequent lift increments. Too many things depend upon that exchange. The entire JDC
derives its execution schedules and plans from JDS. Manual entry of schedules through
a WIN site following scheduling is not acceptable. The scheduler requires a direct
interface with JDS, preferably at a speed of 9600 baud or greater. Even at that speed,
a large schedule could take up to an hour to upload. One place where the transfer rate
could be improved is the regional area. The CONUS MSC and MTMC Area Commands
are located in close proximity to each other. Given the close nature of coordination
required between MTMC and MSC locally, some sort of high speed, secure data link or
even sharing of computing resources could significantly enhance that coordination. For
example, if it were determined that MSC's requirement for a mainframe computer in the
area was not sufficiently justified, perhaps a mainframe computer for both MSC and
MTMC together would be more easily supported, especially by USTRANSCOM.
In terms of information flow, some work has been done previously to study
requirements. The U.S. Department of Transportation prepared a report for JCS in 1986
to determine possible interfaces for MTMC and MSC [Ref. 9]. The report is reasonably
detailed in discussing JDC and MTMC systems, but unfortunately the preparers of the
report were led to believe that SEASTRAT would be MSC's execution scheduling system.
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As of this writing, SEASTRAT is only a deliberate planning tool with no execution
scheduler programmed in the immediate future. Still, the report can provide a starting
point for establishing a more effective interface in the locality.
Two other areas of interface to be addressed are the Maritime Administration
(MarAd) and NCSORG. MarAd is responsible for supporting sealift through the Ready
Reserve Fleet (RRF), National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), the Voluntary Tanker
Program, and Sealift Readiness Program. In its wartime capacity as the National
Shipping Authority (NSA), MarAd is responsible for the requisitioning of U.S. flag
merchants to provide additional lift in time of war [Ref. 10]. In time of mobilization,
MarAd would be the primary source of lift assets for the initial surge. The only
automated interface between MSC and MarAd is a secure teletype link referenced in the
Department of Defense and Department of Commerce memorandum of agreement that
addresses shipping support of military operations [Ref. 1 1 :p. 17]. This is presumably
where MarAd will identify assets to be made available for lift and MSC will identify
requirements. Such a link would be probably sufficient for those purposes, but, if
MarAd, in its wartime capacity as the NSA, had a greater requirement for information,
that link would have to be reevaluated.
The NCSORG question is somewhat more difficult. The easiest and most desirable
solution would be to maintain scheduling authority with MSC and have the NCSORG
direct schedule changes as necessary. Some provision would have to be made to allow
informational access to either the scheduler or JDS for the NCSORG. The difficulty lies
in determining at which point in the scheduling process NCSORG would exercise its
scheduling prerogative. While this would probably not come into question for a non-
wartime mobilization or in the initial stages of the deployment, it is a factor which could




The selection of a scheduling algorithm for an execution scheduling system impacts
all aspects of system structure. This is a topic which requires much more research before
the design of such a system can be implemented. While it is beyond the scope of this
thesis to actually develop the algorithm required, an examination of the potential areas for
algorithm selection and related impacts is in order.
A. MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
The first area of consideration is a mathematical programming approach to the
scheduling problem. This consists of linear and integer programming techniques. This
has been the approach most frequently used in the past for some of the deliberate planning
tools available today. Because a linear programming problem formulation requires a
continuous vice discrete flow structure, development to date has centered around using
channelization as a method of aggregating cargo requirements to reduce the problem size
and meet the continuous flow assumption. Channelization gives the formulation a
structure similar to a pipeline flow problem. For example, under channelization, a
10,000 MTon cargo moving from POE to POD in 10 days would not be modelled as
such. It would be modelled as 1000 MTons flowing per day over 10 days. This structure
was the one for a deliberate planning package developed for USTRANSCOM called
SCOPE-GT [Ref. 12:p. 21]. It is also the approach used in SAIL with some modification
[Ref. 6:p. 19].
There are some problems with this approach, especially for execution scheduling.
The most significant deficiency is one of cargo tracking and identification. If cargoes are
aggregated into a channel as a continuous flow, it becomes impossible within the structure
of the linear program and solution to identify individual cargoes and ships. SAIL
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improves upon this somewhat by aggregating cargoes into a channel by unit loads and
trying to schedule a channel to a single ship. However, there are no guarantees that this
in fact will be the result. [Ref. 6: p. 29] The consequence of not aggregating cargoes
increases the size of the linear program, rendering it potentially insoluble. Yet, the
ability to track the movement of cargoes in a discrete fashion is a necessary requirement
for an execution scheduling system. Two previous Naval Postgraduate School thesis
students, Collier [Ref. 12] and Lally [Ref. 13], examined this deficiency in the context
of deliberate planning systems and offered integer programming and variable reduction
techniques in linear programming as potential means for structuring deliberate planning
problems. Integer programming formulations meet the requirements for a discrete
solution, but are typically more intensive computationally. Variable reduction techniques
are used to reduce the size of a linear programming formulation. With the channelization
approach as implemented in SAIL, these techniques all appear to be effective for lift
scheduling in the deliberate planning process. Unfortunately, they do not appear to be
the appropriate strategy for execution scheduling.
Another factor which weighs against the use of these methods in execution
scheduling is the dynamic nature of execution scheduling. A linear program or an integer
program cannot be easily structured to handle the increasing time window of incremental
scheduling. These mathematical programming techniques, by structure, require a
complete problem for solution. If all of the lift assets, cargoes, times, and other critical
constraints are known in advance for the entire execution, then such a formulation might
be attractive. Unfortunately, execution scheduling is done in a dynamic context with the
scheduling horizon increasing incrementally. For example, a linear program is used to
develop a schedule for days C000-C029. The increment is increased to extend through
day C031. The linear program is then used to recompute the schedule. Because the
linear program solves two different, complete problems, the first schedule will likely have
little similarity to the second. This can be a problem if a number of cargoes are already
waiting to load or are in transit and the second schedule mandates a move between ships.
The method frequently used to alleviate this problem is to develop a penalty for removing
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cargoes that have already been loaded. Unfortunately, such methods unacceptably
increase the computational size of an already large problem.
However, total exclusion of mathematical programming techniques in addressing
execution scheduling is not necessarily desired. Such techniques may be appropriate for
use in a subproblem within the scheduler. But, a pure mathematical programming
solution for the entire scheduling problem will not be a viable approach in terms of
structure or computation time.
B. HEURISTIC ALGORITHMS
Given the size of the execution scheduling problem, a heuristic approach appears
to hold the most promise. Such approaches are characterized by algorithms that apply
intelligent criteria to determine a solution to a particular problem from a large number of
possible solutions. The solution may be approximate, or in the case of optimization
problems, sub-optimal. Some examples of heuristic algorithms are Newton's method for
numerically approximating the value of an integral or Dijkstra's algorithm for determining
the shortest path through a network of nodes. Depending on the criteria, a heuristic
algorithm can produce a solution very quickly or quite slowly. SEACOP's solution
algorithm is an example of a heuristic algorithm that performs its task quite slowly. It
develops schedules using a cost/benefit analysis heuristic that is based on aggregating all
of the problem constraints into a penalty cost form. Wasted space on a ship is an
example of a constraint for which a penalty is assigned. After a schedule is developed,
it is then examined for "goodness", and bad cargo assignments are unassigned according
to the worst cost/benefit values. Those cargoes must then be rescheduled. This process
is significantly slow and inefficient in structure. [Ref. 5: pp. 2-80 - 2-85]
However, not all heuristic approaches are as bad as SEACOP's. In fact, one
solution methodology appears promising. Within the last several years, more attention
has been given to a class of problems known as Vehicle Routing with Time Windows
[Ref. 14]. These essentially involve a network of origins, destinations, and, possibly,
intermediate stops for which vehicles must be assigned. For each arc in the network, a
cost and time to travel are specified. For each node (stop), a time window giving the
earliest arrival date and the latest arrival date is specified, a constraint structure quite
similar to the execution scheduling problem. These problems, if small or moderate in
size, are amenable to solution through mathematical programming techniques. But for
the large problems, the methodology centers around a heuristic approach to determine a
feasible routing solution. This solution might not be the optimal solution, but given the
size of the problem and the difficulty involved in computing the optimal solution, a
feasible schedule that is "good" is acceptable. One such heuristic is a generalized
permanent labeling algorithm as applied to the time windows structure [Ref. 15]. This
heuristic is essentially a shortest path algorithm modified to consider time windows.
Another is the Advanced Dial-A-Ride with Time Windows heuristic algorithm [Ref. 16]
which deals with pickup, delivery, and quality constraints in scheduling multiple vehicles.
Requests for pickup are made dynamically, though well in advance of the pickup time.
While neither of these algorithms completely address the execution scheduling problem,
they contain a structure and methodology close enough to it to be worth much more
investigation.
C. SCHEDULING DYNAMICS
One reason the heuristic approaches as described above are intuitively appealing for
the execution scheduling problem is that they are capable of addressing a dynamic
scheduling process. This dynamic process is characterized by two factors. The first
factor is the incremental approach to lift scheduling. In a situation where sealift execution
scheduling is required, JDS procedures dictate that the initial schedule be developed for
the first 30 days of deployment. Following the development of that increment, the
scheduling horizon is increased in increments of at least one day of lift. The size of the
increase is not otherwise specified. As examined above, a mathematical programming
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approach cannot satisfactorily perform in such a situation. Yet, the heuristic approaches
can be structured to handle the changing schedule size.
The second factor is one of ship allocation uncertainty. At any point in the
scheduling process, there may not be enough lift assets identified to schedule lift against.
There are three possible methods of dealing with this uncertainty. The first is the one
used by MSC with SEACOP. If lift assets are not known when SEACOP is run,
intelligence estimates are obtained for ship locations. From those estimates, a guess is
made as to which ships will be allocated for sealift. The schedule is then developed using
those ships. The second method is to develop notional ships that are representative of the
type of ships that would be allocated. The notional ships are then used for scheduling.
The problem with these two approaches is that if the ships actually allocated are
significantly different in characteristics from those used for scheduling, recomputation of
the entire schedule is required. This is not an efficient way to schedule. The third and
more reasonable method is to structure the scheduler to schedule ships dynamically as
they are allocated for sealift. This requires some dynamic representation of the cargo to
be scheduled to facilitate the assignment of ships as they are allocated. One favorable
consequence of this approach is that no special effort is required to incorporate returning
lift assets into the scheduling process. Once an asset is identified as returning, it can be
scheduled against the unscheduled cargo given its projected return date. This structure
would be amenable to the heuristic methods described previously, though further work
is necessary, especially to determine the best algorithm to use, especially when multiple
ships are allocated at the same time.
D. RULES/CONSTRAINTS/PARAMETERS
A discussion of algorithmic considerations would be incomplete without closer
examination of the scheduling rules and constraints that will affect an execution
scheduling system. Much of the information presented here is drawn from factors
incorporated in SEACOP and SEASTRAT [Refs. 5,6]. While these packages are not
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suited to the execution scheduling problem, their identification of lift scheduling
constraints is reasonably complete.
1. Cargo Related Constraints
Cargo characteristics will have a tremendous effect upon the scheduling
process. Cargo volume and weight characteristics are the most obvious, but many special
characteristics exist for many different cargoes, including requirements for segregation,
ammunition restrictions, containerization, and special handling equipment [Ref. 4: pp.
3-13 - 3-52]. Some unit loads require personnel in attendance. The assumption that
berthing space is available for those personnel is not necessarily a reality. Loading
sequences for specific priority cargoes may be specified to ensure proper offload at POD.
Close examination of the TUCHA file and Cargo Category Codes will be required to
determine the significance of any special requirements that will impact scheduling.
2. Ship Characteristics
Obviously, the characteristics of the lift assets available are critical to effective
scheduling. The speed, volume, weight, draft, and length of a given ship are required
to determine what cargoes can be carried and which ports a ship might operate in.
Generalization by ship type is not appropriate since there is wide variation in those
parameters even among ships of a single type. Another consideration is one of mission.
A tanker would probably not be best utilized in carrying ammunition or trucks. A non-
self sustaining container ship needs specific crane services that might not be available in
smaller ports without a crane ship or some other special arrangement. Speed will be an
area where the NCSORG will have an impact. The maximum speed of a given ship




Computation of distances is, for the most part, not a terribly complex problem.
Some provision does need to be made for distance computation as a function of canal
status. If the Panama Canal is not available, the distance between the Gulf Coast and
Hawaii or California becomes much greater. One aspect of this computation which bears
scrutiny is distance generation versus distance lookup. SAIL and SEACOP both compute
distances at run time. If this computation is slower than a table lookup function, then
some consideration of precomputing distances and storing them for lookup might be in
order, so long as means remain of computing distances not already in the table. Also
included under distance considerations are intermediate stops for onload/offload enroute
and NCSORG track routing.
4. Port Considerations
Port impacts upon the problem can be significant. Certain ports may have
draft/length restrictions or may not have the special handling equipment required for
certain cargoes. Throughput at a given port might be constrained. Unfortunately, port
selection is not within the purview of the sealift scheduling process at this time. MTMC
selects the POE for a load and MSC determines what ship should be assigned to that load.
If POE selection becomes a sealift scheduling subproblem, then more latitude can be
given to the initial movement of a load. But, for the time being, the execution scheduling
system is only concerned with whether or not a certain ship can be serviced in a given
port.
5. Time Constraints
The three TPFDD/JDS specified times drive the time windows and constraints
for the execution scheduling problem. The ALD indicates the date that the cargo is
available for loading, and the EAD and LAD define the time window at POD. Other
times which have an effect on the ability to meet those times are ship loading times and
arrival time of ships at the POE for loading. Again, the NCSORG can have an effect in
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that convoying can severely constrain the system's ability to schedule lift to arrive within
the time window specified.
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VI. PROPOSED SYSTEM STRUCTURE
Based on the considerations discussed in previous chapters, Figure 1 is proposed as
the structure for a sealift execution scheduling system. This structure is centered around
three major components. The scheduler establishes the first increment of lift, given the
cargo requirements and available ships. The rescheduler is used for all subsequent
scheduling tasks, using all unscheduled cargo, unscheduled ships, and partially scheduled
ships. The requirements generator is used to examine lift shortfalls and determine
requirements for ships that can be used to make a request of MarAd for additional assets.
This is a broad, high-level system specification. It lacks the detail necessary to produce
a complete scheduling system. The point of this structure is to provide a framework upon
which intelligent research and detailed system design can be founded.
A. INITIAL SCHEDULER
The initial scheduler, as proposed and shown in Figure 2, will be a first pass, single
pass scheduler. It will be used to compute the schedule for the first increment of sealift,
given the ships actually allocated. This is one possible place where a mathematical
programming approach might be a viable technique, so long as some provision is made
for allowing cargo to remain unscheduled if there are no lift assets available to move it.
In mathematical programming this is typically accomplished by adding a dummy variable
to the formulation. In this case, a dummy ship would have to be established and the
formulation would need to be structured so that only cargoes without a viable lift asset
available would be assigned to the dummy ship. Cargoes that have a good assignment
must be protected from assignment to the dummy ship. This is not an easy formulation.
In a such a situation, the dummy ship would have to have large capacity to allow for all
of the possible unscheduled cargoes, yet it would have to have a high usage cost to
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Figure 2 Initial Scheduler
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prevent it from being chosen over an actual ship. This dummy ship would also have to
be structured to allow for clear identification of the cargoes assigned to it. This would
then be the unscheduled cargo output as shown in Figure 2. This topic has to be studied
in much greater detail. Even with the reasonably static nature of the initial scheduler,
a heuristic approach may still be required to meet the output and reporting requirements.
Another stipulation that could affect the structure of the initial scheduler is the size
and scheduling of the first increment. For the reasons discussed in the previous chapter,
it is more sensible to schedule ships only as they are allocated. This might preclude
complete scheduling of the first increment in the time frame specified by the JDS
Procedures Manual [Ref. 3] if sufficient lift assets are not identified and allocated early
in the scheduling process. The two artificial approaches, the intelligence estimate and the
notional ships, in truth, do not meet this requirement either because the schedules based
on those approaches are notional, not actual. In this light, the initial scheduler should not
be compelled to produce a completely scheduled first increment. Rather, it should take
the assets available and schedule them within the 30 day window required for that
increment. If the structure of JDS requires a complete schedule, the JDS database should
be modified to relax this requirement, especially since any complete schedule developed
under these conditions would be artificial at best.
B. RESCHEDULE!*
The rescheduler, for lack of a better term, will be the scheduling work horse of the
system. As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 3, the rescheduler will be the iterative part of
the scheduler, dealing with changes in cargoes, ships, and the increase in the scheduling
window due to the incremental scheduling process. This is the portion of the execution
process that will be heavily dependent upon carefully conceived and implemented heuristic
solution techniques, such as the time-windows algorithms discussed earlier. As seen in
Figure 3, there will be essentially four categories of input. The two cargo categories will
























problem as a result of the increasing scheduling window. The two ship categories will
be based on unused capacity from previous passes and that capacity added either by new
ships or ships returning for subsequent assignment after performing a previous lift
mission. The three output categories of this module will be scheduled ships/cargo,
unscheduled cargo for consideration in another pass, and unscheduled or partially
scheduled ships available for another pass. For the partially scheduled ships, some
determination must be made as to whether or not its remaining capacity will be made
available if such availability will impact the feasibility of meeting the delivery window
of the cargoes already loaded. This is where the quality of the heuristic algorithms
selected will be critical. If the ship loading and assignment criteria are not good, ships
will be poorly loaded and a large amount of cargo will remain unscheduled. In an asset
scarce and time-critical deployment this is clearly not acceptable.
In this light, some sort of a broad, best- fit approach might be best. As a ship is up
for assignment, the unscheduled requirements are searched for the best and most efficient
loading, where the criteria for a best fit include the time windows, loading, and cargo
priority considerations. This is obviously a complex question, deserving much more
study before an effective solution can be implemented.
C. REQUIREMENTS GENERATOR
If, in fact, lift assets will be scarce or slow in coming, some means must be made
available to estimate the shortfall in lift capacity under execution and characterize that
shortfall in terms of ships required. Figure 4 shows the structure of such an estimator.
In this case, some application of notional capacities is appropriate in that those capacities
will only be utilized for the purpose of determining the number and type of ships that
MarAd will be requested to provide for the execution effort. Inputs to this module will
be the remaining unscheduled cargo and known returning ships. With respect to known
returning ships, a decision will have to be made as to where in the return cycle a ship will



















Figure 4 Requirements Generator
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been so designated is attrited during the return cycle, the lift shortfall will be more severe
than planned for. This is balanced against the recognition that the earlier an asset can be
planned against, the more effective and timely the scheduling process. This is a
consideration that will have to be based on the threat and probability of attrition during
execution.
The notional characteristics to be used for this generator can potentially come from
several sources. There are notional ship parameters that have been incorporated as
planning factors in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), but they were unavailable
at this writing. JCS policy prohibits the release of planning factors to DoD schools,
though hopefully they could be made available to a scheduling system developer. Another
possible way to derive notional capacities would be to use some sort of a broad measure
across several ships and ship types. Such derivation, while not desirable for actual
scheduling, might be sufficient for developing a request for additional shipping. This
segment is also where the nature of the external interface with MarAd comes into
question. If a large request is to be made of MarAd, the single secure teletype might not
be sufficient for communicating those requirements to MarAd or for MarAd' s response.
These questions will all be contingent upon the size of the OPLAN to be executed and the
required lift capacity.
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Vn. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This analysis of sealift execution scheduling requirements is by no means complete.
Rather, it is a broad first attempt at defining and quantifying an important and complex
problem. As has been mentioned previously, significant work remains, particularly in the
examination and development of an appropriate scheduling algorithm. One
recommendation for such development is to contract for algorithmic research prior to
contracting for an entire system. This would ensure proper development of the most
critical component of the scheduling system. The remainder of the system could then be
designed and developed around that scheduler. One problem with concurrent
development of a system and a scheduler is that critical operational aspects of a scheduler
may have to be compromised in order to make it compatible with the overall system.
Prior development of the scheduler minimizes this problem. If the scheduler is accorded
the requisite developmental priority and recognized software design concepts are followed,
stressing early identification of interfaces, modularity, and complete problem definition
prior to development, then an effective sealift execution scheduling system can be
realized.
Given that the development and completion of an execution scheduling system will
probably not be a near-term reality, some interim measures to improve execution
scheduling are in order. The first step is to improve the level of JDS support provided
to MSC. This improvement includes training and dedicated programming support from
USTRANSCOM. Such support has been provided in the past to MSC and the area
commands in a sporadic and piecemeal fashion. For example, a change to the JDS
database implemented in the fall of 1988 rendered a number of specialized database
retrievals useless to MSCPAC. This significantly reduced scheduling efficiency and
limited the use of a locally developed BASIC program used to sort and aggregate lift
requirements. Second or third hand JDS support through OPNAV is not sufficient. It
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does not seem unreasonable that USTRANSCOM should provide specialized JDS support
to one or all of the TOAs that it is responsible for, especially since such support would
increase overall mission capability.
Another area where short-term improvement could be realized is in electronic data
transfer, both internally and externally. Internally, an effort must be made to resolve the
electronic media entry security problem with the WIN sites. It makes little sense to
collect scheduling information online, then be required to print it out for manual entry by
keyboard in the WIN site. This problem needs to be addressed from the standpoint of
allowing the entry of media containing information without compromising WIN security.
This problem cannot be ignored if a swift and effective scheduling process is to be
developed. Externally, the initiatives for improving data communications between the
MTMC and MSC area commands could improve the overall process. The
communications improvements discussed in Chapter IV are not strictly tied to
development of a specific scheduling system. Improved coordination and information
transfer could easily be realized if such a communications interface were established.
Sealift execution scheduling is a large, complex process, dependent upon a myriad
of factors. While algorithmic considerations are a significant portion of the problem, all
of the factors and processes impacting upon lift scheduling must be evaluated and
accounted for. The ability to effectively and efficiently schedule lift is crucial to this
nation's strategic mobilization capability. It has to be done right.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
The definitions contained herein are drawn from NWP 80 [Ref. 1], The Joint Staff
Officer's Guide [Ref. 2], and the JDS Users Data Element Dictionary [Ref. 4]. Consult
these references for other terms or further definition of the terms below.
Available to Load Date (ALD): A date specified for each unit in the TPFDD indicating
the earliest a cargo may begin loading at the port of embarkation. [Ref. 2]
Cargo Category Codes (CCC): A three letter cargo identifier which provides descriptive
information as to type, size, and transportation mode required. [Ref. 4]
Course of Action (COA): A possible plan open to an individual or commander that
would accomplish or is related to the accomplishment of a mission. [Ref. 2]
Crisis Action Procedures (CAP): See Crisis Action System.
Crisis Action System (CAS): A system specified in JCS Pub 5-02.4 that gives guidance
and procedures for joint operation planning by military forces during emergency or time-
sensitive situations. The procedures are designed to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff information to develop timely recommendations to the National Command
Authority for decisions involving the use of U.S. military forces. [Ref. 2]
C-Day: The day on which movement from origin begins or is to begin. The deployment
may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements
using any or all types of transportation. For planning, C-Day remains unnamed, but
under execution, C-Day is established under the authority and direction of the Secretary
of Defense. [Ref. 2]
D-Day: The day on which a particular operation begins or is scheduled to begin. This
operation may be land assault, air strike, naval bombardment, parachute assault, or
amphibious assault. [Ref. 2]
Earliest Arrival Date (EAD): A day, relative to C-Day, specified by the planner as the
earliest date a cargo can be accepted at a port of debarkation. [Ref. 2]
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Effective U.S. Control Fleet (EUSC): U.S. citizen owned shipping registered and
operated under a flag of convenience.
Flag of Convenience : Merchant ship registration in countries where owner citizenship
is not required and significant economic and operating benefits are realized through such
registry.
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP): The JSCP contains the military strategy to
support the national security objectives and the derived military objectives. It gives
guidance, based on projected military capabilities and conditions during the short rang
period, and task assignments to the unified and specified Commanders in Chief and Chiefs
of the Services for the accomplishment of military tasks. It apportions forces and lift
assets for planning. [Ref. 2]
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): The Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief
of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps. [Ref. 2]
Joint Deployment System (JDS): Personnel, procedures, directives, communications
systems, and electronic data processing systems that directly support time-sensitive
planning and execution and complement peacetime deliberate planning by disseminating
deployment information. [Ref. 2]
Joint Deployment Community (JDC): Those headquarters, commands, and agencies
involved in training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and
sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations. The JDC
normally consists of the JCS Joint Staff, Services, unified and specified combatant
commands including USTRANSCOM, and defense agencies as appropriate to a given
scenario. [Ref. 2]
Latest Arrival Date (LAD): A day, relative to C-day, specified by the planner as the
latest date a cargo can be accepted at a port of debarkation. [Ref. 2]
Maritime Administration (MarAd): The unit of the Department of Transportation
designated to develop, promote, and maintain the U.S. merchant marine. MarAd is
responsible for the RRF, NDRF, and in war as the National Shipping Authority, for
requisitioning merchant shipping to support mobilization. [Ref. 7]
Measurement Ton (MTon): A volumetric measure of cargo equivalent to 40 cubic feet
of volume. [Ref. 1]
Military Sealift Command, Atlantic (MSCLANT): The MSC area command with
responsibility for the Atlantic area.
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Military Sealift Command, Pacific (MSCPAC): The MSC area command with
responsibility for the Pacific area.
Military Airlift Command (MAC): The single management agency within the
Department of Defense responsible for air transportation.
Military Sealift Command (MSC): The single management agency within the
Department of Defense responsible for ocean transportation. [Ref. 1]
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC): The single management agency
within the Department of Defense responsible for management of DoD cargo movements
within the Continental United States. [Ref. 17]
National Command Authorities (NCA): The President and the Secretary of Defense or
their duly deputized alternates or successors. [Ref. 2]
National Shipping Authority (NSA): The emergency shipping operations agency
established out of MarAd in time of war to acquire and manage merchant shipping.
[Ref. 1]
National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF): A fleet of ships acquired and maintained by
MarAd for use in mobilization or emergency. The NDRF less the RRF is composed of
older ships maintained at a relatively low level of readiness, available only on
mobilization or Congressional declaration of emergency. [Ref. 1]
Naval Control of Shipping Organization (NCSORG): The organization that in time of
war or national emergency exercises authority for the control and direction of actual
merchant ship movement. [Ref. 1]
N-Day: A day prior to C-Day. N002 would reflect a day two days before C-Day.
[Ref. 2]
Operation Plan (OPLAN): Any plan prepared for the conduct of military operations in
a hostile environment by the commander of a unified or specified command in response
to a requirement established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Ref. 2]
Operation Order (OPORD): A directive issued by a commander to subordinate
commanders for effecting coordinated execution of an operation. [Ref. 2]
Operational Control Authority (OCA): The naval commander responsible for the
control of movements and the protection of allied merchant ships within a specified
geographical limit. [Ref. 1]
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Port of Embarkation (POE): The geographic point in the routing scheme where a
movement requirement will begin its strategic deployment. [Ref. 2]
Port of Debarkation (POD): The geographic point in the routing scheme where a
movement requirement will complete its strategic deployment. [Ref. 2]
Ready Reserve Force (RRF): A portion of the NDRF composed of ships acquired by
MarAd with Navy funding or for the NDRF maintained in a higher state of readiness and
available for service without mobilization or Congressional declaration of emergency.
[Ref. 1]
Sealift Readiness Program (SRP): A formal agreement between MSC and U.S. flag
ocean carriers for acquisition of ships and related equipment under conditions of less than
full mobilization. [Ref. 1]
Sealift Strategic Planning System (SEASTRAT): MSC's newest deliberate planning
system for sealift. SEASTRAT is programmed as a replacement for SEACOP.
Strategic Algorithm for Improving Lift (SAIL): SAIL is the sealift scheduling module
contained within SEASTRAT.
Strategic Sealift Contingency Planning System (SEACOP): MSC's 1970 era deliberate
planning system for sealift.
Supported Command/Commander: The commander who originates operation plans in
response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an employment
scenario, the supported commander will be the commander tasked with executing a given
course of action. [Ref. 2]
Supporting Command/Commander: A commander who furnishes augmentation forces
or other support to a supported commander. [Ref. 2]
Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD): The computer-supported portion of an
OPLAN that contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo, and personnel data,
and movement data for the OPLAN. Information includes in-place units, prioritized
arrival of units deployed to support the OPLAN, etc. [Ref. 2]
Transportation Operating Agencies (TOA): Military Traffic Management Command
(MTMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Airlift Command (MAC).
Type Unit Data File (TUCHA): A files that gives standard planning data and movement
characteristics for personnel, cargo, and accompanying supplies associated with
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deployable type units of fixed composition. The file contains the weight and volume of
selected cargo categories, physical characteristics of the cargo, and the number of
personnel requiring non-organic transportation. (A person assigned to a destroyer would
be considered to have organic transportation.) [Ref. 2]
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM): The unified combatant command
for transportation missions, responsibilities, and the forces of MTMC, MSC, and MAC.
[Ref. 18]
Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA): Procedures for voluntary contribution of tanker
capacity by commercial tanker owners and operators administered by MarAd. [Ref. 1]
World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS): The system that
provides the means for operational direction and technical administrative support involved
in the function of command and control of U.S. military forces. [Ref. 2]
WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN): The system that provides for remote access
and data transfer between users within WWMCCS. [Ref. 2]
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